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In Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.,1 the U.S.
Supreme Court provided a justification for patent exhaustion and established
rules governing its application. Both U.S. and foreign sales of a patented
product trigger application of the doctrine to the article sold.2 This allows
patented articles to flow in commerce without any attached patent rights in-
terfering with the free alienability of such articles.3 Further, conditions at-
tached to the sale of patented articles are enforceable via breach of contract
actions rather than by patent infringement actions.4 Analogizing to copyright
law, these bright-line rules should permit avoidance of exhaustion by licens-
ing mere use rights for patented products. However, it is proposed that bona
fide purchaser rules apply to such licenses so that downstream users of pat-
ented products may possess these products free of any use restrictions they
lack notice of; thereby furthering the policy of minimizing restraints on alien-
ation of such goods.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE IMPRESSION PRODUCTS DECISION
Lexmark manufactures and sells laser printers and replaceable ink car-
tridges for those printers.5 Typically, the ink cartridges are no longer usable
once they use up the toner material contained within them.6 Lexmark engages
in a profitable worldwide business selling new cartridges to its printer users.7
However, third parties, known as remanufacturers, acquire used cartridges
both from domestic and foreign users, refill the cartridges with toner mate-
* Professor of Law & Co-Director, Intellectual Property Law Concentration, Suf-
folk University Law School, Boston, Massachusetts. B.S. (Engineering), 1976,
Hofstra University; J.D., 1981, Western New England University School of
Law; L.L.M., 1986, Temple University School of Law. 2019 © Andrew Beck-
erman-Rodau.
1. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
2. Id. at 1527.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1526.
5. See generally LEXMARK, https://www.lexmark.com/en_us.html (visited Aug.
26, 2019).
6. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1529.
7. Id.
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rial, and then resell the cartridges to printer users at a lower price than the
new cartridges sold by Lexmark.8
Lexmark has engaged in various efforts to minimize the competition
created by remanufacturers.9 It owns utility patents both on certain compo-
nents of the cartridges and on how the cartridges are used.10 These patents
have been asserted against remanufacturers in patent infringement lawsuits.11
Lexmark has installed electronic chips in the cartridges that prevent reuse
once the toner has been used up.12 However, enterprising remanufacturers
developed strategies and technological know-how to overcome these chips.13
Lexmark has also offered consumer purchasers a twenty-percent discount on
cartridges if they agree to use them once and return the empty cartridges to
Lexmark.14
Initially, Lexmark had success bringing patent infringement actions
against remanufacturers.15 However, that approach was significantly limited
by the recent Supreme Court decision in Impression Products. The Court
noted that a patent grants exclusive rights to the patent owner and explained
that the sale of a patented item by the patent owner ends or exhausts any
patent rights in the particular item sold.16 Hence, patent law can no longer be
used to control what is done with the item post-sale.17 The Court viewed a
patented product as personal property that “[t]he purchaser and all subse-
quent owners are free to use or resell . . . just like any other item of personal
property, without fear of . . . [a patent] infringement lawsuit.”18 This is con-
sistent with the patent statute, which expressly states that “patents shall have
the attributes of personal property,”19 and with the Supreme Court’s treat-
ment of the analogous doctrine of copyright exhaustion in Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc.20
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1529–30.
10. Id. at 1525.
11. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1530.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1529–30.
15. Id. at 1530–31.
16. Id. at 1529; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2018).
17. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1529.
18. Id.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2018).
20. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
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III. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PATENT
EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
Impression Products noted that the exhaustion doctrine, a common law
doctrine with a long and well-established history,21 acts as a limit on patent
rights.22 Lower courts have also recognized the well-established exhaustion
doctrine.23 However, both lower courts and the Supreme Court have es-
poused different underlying policy justifications for the doctrine. The Federal
Circuit stated that the exhaustion doctrine was based on the premise that a
patentee has been fairly economically rewarded for the use of the patented
article upon its initial sale.24 This rationale was approvingly acknowledged
by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,25
which discussed the doctrine with regard to genetically modified soybean
seeds.26 Nevertheless, in the subsequent Impression Products decision, the
Supreme Court unequivocally held that the exhaustion doctrine is based on
the common law principle against restraints on the alienation of personal
property.27 Such restraints, which are generally viewed negatively by the
law,28 can be voided on public policy grounds.29 They can act as a cloud on
title to property, which can interfere with the free flow of goods once they
enter commerce, because a purchaser of the goods may be unsure whether
she is getting a good title that is unfettered by limitations or restrictions.30
Likewise, such restraints can add transaction costs if a purchaser has to un-
dertake efforts to ascertain if the seller has a clear title to the goods offered
21. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1531–36; see generally Alfred C. Server &
William J. Casey, Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions on Patented Products
Following Quanta, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 564–76 (2013) (review of history of
patent exhaustion).
22. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1531 (“The Patent Act grants patentees the
‘right to exclude others from making, using offering for sale, or selling [their]
invention[s].’”). “For over 160 years, the doctrine of patent exhaustion has
imposed a limit on that right to exclude.” Id.; see also id. at 1534.
23. See generally Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 735
(Fed Cir. 2016); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed Cir.
1992).
24. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm., 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir.
2001), overruled in part by Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137
S. Ct. 1523 (2017); see also Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d
1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
25. 569 U.S. 278, 284 (2013).
26. Id. at 284–89.
27. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1531.
28. Id. at 1536.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1534.
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for sale.31 An example of this occurs with real property transactions where,
during the pendency of a sale, the buyer must hire an attorney and title com-
pany to investigate the title of the property being sold. A historical examina-
tion of prior deeds and other recorded documents must occur to ascertain
whether the seller actually owns the property. Additionally, the examination
must determine that no encumbrances affecting the title exist. The existence
of any encumbrances may render the title unmarketable and excuse the buyer
from completing the sale. Even if no encumbrances exist, a bank financing
the sale may require the buyer to purchase title insurance to protect against
unforeseen encumbrances.
The differing rationales for exhaustion are perhaps not relevant with
regard to the sale of patented products in the United States. However, the
Federal Circuit found the rationale relied on relevant when distinguishing
between subsequent sales of patented products inside and outside the United
States.32 According to the Federal Circuit, the patentee was fully compen-
sated for her patented product when it was initially sold in the United
States.33 In contrast, when a third party produced and sold the product in a
foreign country, patent exhaustion did not apply to the product upon its im-
portation into the United States because the patentee had not been rewarded
in the form of monetary compensation for that specific product.34 Impression
Products eliminated this distinction and held that patent exhaustion applied
to a product once it was sold, regardless of whether it was sold in the United
States or in a foreign country.35 Impression Products justified this conclusion
based on a policy of preventing restraints on the alienation of personal prop-
erty once such property has entered commerce via a sale by the patentee.36
This approach is logical because not all downstream users will be aware of a
prior foreign transaction in light of the complex international supply chains
utilized by many companies today.
31. See generally Bowman, 569 U.S. at 284 (noting that not extending copyright
exhaustion, referred to as the first-sale doctrine, to foreign produced books or
artwork that were subsequently imported into the United States would add
transactional costs in the form of a complex permission-verifying process).
32. See Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1531; see also Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz
Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (patent exhaustion limited
to sales in United States).
33. See Impression Products, 137 S. Ct. at 1531.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 1529.
36. Id. at 1538. But see id. at 1538–39 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (arguing against finding patent exhaustion based on the sale of
patented good outside the United States). See generally Kumiko Kitaoka, Pat-
ent Exhaustion Connects Common Law to Equity: Impression Products, Inc. v.
Lexmark International, Inc., 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 96, 99 (2018) (as-
serting consequences of exhaustion based on foreign sales).
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IV. DOWNSTREAM CONTROL OF PRODUCTS
Producers of goods and services may want to control both the initial
introduction into commerce and exert continuing control over their goods
and services after their injection into the marketplace.37 This may be desired
by producers for multiple reasons, including maintaining positive reputa-
tional aspects of their brands38 and maximizing revenue generation.39
A variety of approaches can be used to exert continuing control. From a
legal perspective, these approaches are typically categorized as relying on
either contractual or property theory.40 Under a contract approach, a good or
service is provided subject to contractual requirements.41 For example, a pro-
ducer may agree to sell a product to a retailer provided that the goods are
displayed and marketed in specified ways.42 Additionally, the agreement may
stipulate that the retailer must provide certain warranty services as a condi-
tion of being permitted to sell the goods.43
Under a property approach, a producer may only grant use rights as
opposed to ownership rights in a product or service.44 Ownership rights are
traditionally viewed as a bundle of rights, including the right to possess the
37. See generally Williams v. Jani-King of Phila. Inc., 837 F.3d 314, 316–18 (3d
Cir. 2016) (discussing the numerous amount and type of control a franchisor
exerts overs its franchisees).
38. See, e.g., Queen City Pizza v. Domino’s Pizza, 124 F.3d 430, 440–41 (3d Cir.
1997) (“Courts and legal commentators have long recognized that franchise
tying contracts are an essential and important aspect of the franchise form of
business organization because they reduce agency costs and prevent franchis-
ees from free riding—offering products of sub-standard quality insufficient to
maintain the reputational value of the franchise product while benefitting from
the quality control efforts of other actors in the franchise system.”); see also
TALCOTT FRANKLIN, PROTECTING THE BRAND 104–06 (2003) (discussing how
trademark licensees and franchisees utilize trademarks).
39. Attempts to maximize revenue generation by controlling downstream use of
products and services can run afoul of antitrust law. See generally Guy Sagi, A
Comprehensive Economic and Legal Analysis of Tying Arrangements, 38 SEAT-
TLE U. L. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing both antitrust issues and potential benefits
raised by tying arrangements that leverage market power over one product by
requiring purchase of another product for which market power does not exist);
see also CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 664–65 (3d ed. 2017)
(restrictions placed on use of patented products can be found to be patent
misuse).
40. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1532.
41. Id. at 1526.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221
(1979).
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property, use the property, exclude others from the property, and to transfer
the property at issue.45 Use rights are typically viewed as non-possessory
rights.46 This approach is common in the software industry where consumers
are granted licenses to use software rather than ownership of the software.47
More recently, software has been offered as a service for a yearly subscrip-
tion fee rather than being sold to a user.48 Additionally, machinery or other
equipment may be provided pursuant to a lease arrangement which does not
involve transferring title to the machinery or equipment.49
In the patent context, contractual restrictions on downstream use of pat-
ented products are common.50 They may provide geographic limitations or
use restrictions.51 For example, in Bowman v. Monsanto Co., genetically
modified soybean seeds were sold pursuant to use restrictions that permitted
the seeds to only be used for one planting season.52 In Jazz Photo Corp. v.
International Trade Comm., disposable cameras were sold pursuant to a sin-
gle-use restriction.53 Additionally, in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,
medical devices were sold with a single-use restriction.54 Analysis of such
restrictions requires categorizing them as either property or contract rights.
Such categorization then dictates the appropriate analysis and remedies.
45. See id.; Alevizos v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 216 N.W.2d 651, 661 (Minn.
1974); Smith v. Erie R.R. Co., 16 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ohio 1938); see also
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 176 (Cal. 1990)
(Mosk, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 936 (1991).
46. See generally WILLIAM STOEBUCK & DALE WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 8.1, at 435–56 (3d ed. 2000) (distinguishing between possession and use with
regard to rights in real property).
47. See CRAIG ALLEN NARD ET AL., THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 662 (3d
ed. 2011); see also Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License,
35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 279–80 (2003) (describing the contours of typical
software license).
48. See David Politis, The 2017 State of the SaaS-Powered Workplace Report,
BETTERCLOUD MONITOR (May 18, 2017), https://www.bettercloud.com/moni-
tor/state-of-the-saas-powered-workplace-report/.
49. See id.
50. NARD ET AL., supra note 47, at 664; see generally Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The practice of granting
[patent] licenses for restricted use is an old one”).
51. NARD ET AL., supra note 47, at 664.
52. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 278 (2013).
53. Jazz Photop Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm., 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001), over-
ruled in part by Impressions Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523
(2017).
54. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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V. CONDITIONAL SALES
Since Impression Products, the threshold question with regard to
whether patent exhaustion applies to a particular product focuses on whether
the product at issue was sold to another party.55 This sale transaction would
trigger the patent exhaustion doctrine, thus terminating patent rights in the
article sold and barring any patent infringement action arising from the
buyer’s use or importation of the patented article.56 Any conditions applied to
the sale, such as a geographic restriction or single-use restriction, would only
be subject to enforcement via a contract theory.57 Pursuant to this approach,
the condition would only be enforceable if the necessary requirements ex-
isted to create a contract between the buyer and seller.58 Additionally, any
action could only be brought by the seller against the buyer because only the
contracting parties are typically bound by the contractual relationship.59 This
is in contrast to a property-based patent infringement action, which would be
available against any third party who violated a patentee’s patent rights.60 In
light of this, attempting to limit the use of a product via a mere notice applied
to the product may be inadequate. For example, placing a prominent notice
on the front of a product stating “Single-Use Only” may communicate the
seller’s intent.61 However, such a notice by itself may not create an enforcea-
ble contract.62 Furthermore, even if a contract was created, it would not pro-
vide a practical remedy for the scenario involved in Impression Products. In
Impression Products, customers who received the twenty-percent discount
for cartridges in return for promising to use them only once could be liable
for breach of contract if they provided the cartridges to third-party
remanufacturers.63 However, such contractual liability would not necessarily
provide a cause of action against remanufacturers.64 Additionally, this would
55. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017).
Patent exhaustion also applies to patented methods when the method is embod-
ied in an article or device that is sold. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
553 U.S. 617, 628–29 (2008).
56. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1529.
57. Id. at 1527.
58. See generally Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir.
2009) (explaining a contract requires offer, acceptance, consideration, and suf-
ficient specification of essential contractual terms).
59. Id.
60. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2018); see also § 271(a). See generally JOSEPH WIL-
LIAM SINGER, PROPERTY (3d ed. 2010) (“Owners have the right to exclude non-
owners from their property.”).
61. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1533.
62. Id. at 1529.
63. Id. at 1530.
64. Id.
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involve suing your own customers, which is, arguably, a poor business
model.65 It would also involve having to sue numerous individual customers,
which would be impractical.66
VI. USE RIGHTS VS. OWNERSHIP
Alternate property-based approaches should still be permissible after the
Impression Products decision. From a theoretical perspective, the article con-
taining patented subject matter would not be sold—it would have to be pro-
vided via a transaction that transfers rights to a transferee that are less than
ownership. For example, the mere right to use the article could be granted to
the transferee. This would be closely analogous to a use right, which is rec-
ognized in real property law.67 Such use rights are referred to as easements,
profits, real covenants, or equitable servitudes when realty is involved.68
Likewise, use rights could be closely analogous to a lease or rental arrange-
ment commonly used for certain personal property, such as renting a car for a
week.
Frequently, intellectual property rights are transferred via a license, but
the term “license” is sometimes used inconsistently and can contribute to
confusion. Typically, licensing of intellectual property connotes the grant of
the right to use intellectual property under certain conditions or in certain
contexts.69 It does not grant ownership of the property to the licensee.70
Therefore, licensing of intellectual property is analogous to non-possessory
use rights, such as real property easements or leases of personal property.71
A conveyance or transfer of ownership of intellectual property rights is
referred to as an assignment.72 Nevertheless, some licenses may be exclu-
sive73 in nature and coupled with the grant of such extensive rights that they
65. Id.
66. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1530.
67. See generally SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 60.
68. See GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS,
REAL COVENANTS AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES § 2.01, at 5–6 (2d ed. 2004)
(easement is a non-possessory right to engage in some use of another’s land).
69. 1 MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN & FRANK L. POLITANO, DRAFTING LICENSE AGREE-
MENTS § 1.01 at 1–3 (4th ed. 2014).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1–3 n.1; see also 2 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 11:9 at
11–17 (2010) (distinguishing a license of intellectual property from an assign-
ment of intellectual property).
73. An exclusive license could mean that the licensor is only granting one license
although most commonly it means the licensor will not grant other licenses of
the same scope. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 339 (3d ed. 2004).
2019] Impression Products v. Lexmark International 11
resemble assignments. For example, copyright law provides that a “transfer
of copyright ownership” includes an assignment or an exclusive license.74
Consequently, the critical issue is what rights are actually transferred by the
patentee.75 If the patentee merely grants the right to use a patented article or
device in lieu of ownership, that should prevent the application of the patent
exhaustion doctrine because the article has not been sold.76 In contrast, if the
rights granted are so extensive that the licensee has de facto possession and
total control of the article, it can be viewed as having been sold and patent
exhaustion will be applicable.77
A fundamental aspect of a property-based approach is recognizing that a
patented article or device simultaneously comprises both a tangible object
and intangible patent rights.78 The tangible object can be viewed from a prop-
erty law perspective as tangible personal property, while the patent rights can
be viewed as intangible personal property.79 The analogous issue is expressly
recognized under copyright law, which states that “[o]wnership of a copy-
right . . . is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work
is embodied . . . .”80 Despite this distinction, the two pieces of intertwined
property are physically inseparable.81 Granting the owner of the tangible ob-
ject the usual bundle of rights associated with property ownership affects the
patentee’s intangible patent rights in the object. Likewise, granting the paten-
tee the rights associated with owning a patent affects the rights of the tangi-
ble object owner. The resulting inseparability of the tangible and intangible
rights means the law must favor one property owner at the expense of the
other. The determination of whom to favor must, therefore, be a policy-based
decision. The doctrine of patent exhaustion represents a policy decision that
the patentee’s transfer of ownership of a patented article extinguishes the
intangible patent rights in that specific article.82 It is based both historically
and in the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement that favored a policy
74. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
75. See, e.g., Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 241 F.3d 1353, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(license provided non-exclusive, non-transferable world-wide right to make,
use, sell, or lease products covered by certain patents and patent applications).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See The Importance of Intellectual Property Valuation and Protection, MARSH,
https://www.marsh.com/us/insights/reasearch/importance-of-intellectual-prop-
erty.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
79. Id.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2018).
81. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT BASICS 2–3 (2017), https://www.copy-
right.gov/circs/circ01.pdf.
82. Charlene M. Morrow & Armen N. Nercessian, Supreme Court’s Lexmark De-
cision Expands Scope of Patent Exhaustion Defense, FENWICK & WEST (June
12 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXII
of allowing the patented article to be transferred to others free of any
restrictions.83
In contrast, when the patentee does not originally sell the article, the
balance should favor the patentee’s rights. In such a transaction, when the
patentee has only granted limited use rights in a patented article, the
grantee’s rights should be subservient to the patentee’s rights and patent ex-
haustion should not apply.84 This dividing line, based on whether the pat-
ented article was sold, allows the article to freely flow in commerce post-sale
but, at the same time, recognizes the ability of the patentee to alternatively
provide mere use rights in the patented article. Allowing this alternative rec-
ognizes that property owners, in general, have long had the ability to divide
up property rights and transfer interests, such as use rights, that are less than
ownership. In the realm of real property, such use rights commonly take the
form of easements, profits, real covenants, or equitable servitudes.85 Like-
wise, copyright law expressly allows various rights provided by copyright
ownership to be divided and transferred to different parties.86 In light of the
Supreme Court’s reliance on copyright law to inform its analysis of the ex-
haustion doctrine in Impression Products, it seems plausible that the court
will permit the division of patent rights. Such an approach may be desirable
for a patentee to maximize revenue generation, or to maximize control of the
property. It may also spur the creation of innovative property ownership or
business models that could be beneficial to society in general. The risk that
such new models may negatively interfere with competition is best left to the
existing bodies of law, such as antitrust87 law and patent misuse law,88 which
are designed to police business agreements that restrain trade and behavior
that monopolizes commercial marketplaces.89
Nevertheless, the transfer of mere use rights in a patented product could
act as a de facto restraint on alienation because downstream parties who ac-
quire the product may be unaware of the limited rights originally granted.
2, 2017), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/Pages/Supreme-Courts-
Lexmark-Decision-Expands-Scope-of-Patent-Exhaustion-Defense.aspx.
83. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1523
(2017).
84. Id. at 1534.
85. Id.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2018).
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (prohibiting agreements in restraint of trade); id. § 2
(prohibiting monopolizing trade or commerce).
88. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE
LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 21.3 (2003) (discussion of
patent misuse law).
89. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/800691/download.
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Consequently, they may erroneously believe that they have more rights—
such as ownership—in the product than they have actually acquired. This
issue also arises with tangible products that incorporate copyrightable subject
matter. For example, assume the author purchases a copyrighted book. Even
though he owns the book, the author is not free to make a copy of the book
via scanning it.90 If the author purchases a DVD of a copyrighted movie, he
is free to watch the movie privately, but he cannot show it in a public fo-
rum.91 This problem is not limited to the transfer of rights in patented and
copyrighted products. The same issue arises both with real estate and tangi-
ble personal property generally.
A purchaser of real property may incorrectly believe they are acquiring
an unencumbered fee simple absolute in land when, in reality, the land is
encumbered by an easement, profit, real covenant, equitable servitude, or a
mortgage. Likewise, a buyer of tangible personal property may believe they
have acquired good title to a good when, in fact, the seller lacks good title.92
In these situations, the initial creation and transfer of property rights that are
less than full ownership can have the effect of interfering with downstream
transactions. In response, the law developed equitable approaches to mitigate
this problem.93 Typically, those approaches, often referred to as bona fide
purchaser rules,94 focus on notice,95 namely, whether the transferee had no-
tice that he or she was acquiring less than full ownership rights.96
The meaning of “notice” has been further developed to include three
types of notice.97 First is actual notice given to the buyer.98 Second, construc-
tive notice is imputed to the buyer based on material properly recorded in
publicly available governmental records.99 Finally, inquiry notice imputes to
the buyer information about the property which would be revealed by a rea-
90. Scanning the book would violate the reproduction right. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)
(2018).
91. Showing it in a public forum would violate the public performance right. See
id. § 106(4).
92. See generally Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Johnson, 109 F. Supp. 157, 168
(W.D. Ark. 1952) (stating the general rule that a buyer cannot ordinarily get a
better title than what the seller had).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See KORNGOLD, supra note 68, § 5.02, at 197–200 (discussing various types of
notice including actual, record, constructive, and inquiry notice).
96. See generally Mossler Acceptance Co., 109 F. Supp. at 168 (property subject to
encumbrance when taken with notice of encumbrance).
97. KORNGOLD, supra note 68, § 8.01, at 289–90.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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sonable inspection or reasonable inquiries about the property.100 For example,
a purchaser of land will typically acquire the land free of restrictive cove-
nants and easements for which he or she lacks notice.101 Additionally, in
most states, recording statutes can result in land being transferred without
being subject to prior claims if the buyer doesn’t know of the claims and if
the claims are not included in the recorded chain of title maintained by the
government.102 Similar federal recording statutes exist for the transfer of pat-
ents,103 copyrights,104 and trademarks.105 Under the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), the owner of a voidable title in tangible personal property in
the form of goods can transfer good title to a third party who buys the goods
in good faith without notice of the title problem.106 Also, under the U.C.C., a
party who buys goods in good faith from a merchant in the ordinary course
of the merchant’s business can acquire good title to the goods even if the
merchant lacks any title, provided that the buyer is unaware of any title
problems.107 Finally, at common law, money in the form of currency that is
paid for property is acquired free and clear of any prior ownership claims if
the recipient lacks notice of such prior claims.108 This approach favors the
free alienability of property but still enables property owners to transfer,
when appropriate, less than a full unfettered ownership interest in property,
provided that the transferee is on notice of the lesser interest being
transferred.109
100. Id.
101. See id. § 5.02, at 195–96, § 8.01, at 289–90 (notice required to bind subsequent
owners to easements).
102. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES 995–96 (7th ed. 2017) (“In general, a subsequent interest holder
who has no notice of a prior conveyance and who records his interest will
prevail over any prior unrecorded interest”). Patent law contains a recording
statute for assignments of ownership of patent rights. See 35 U.S.C. § 261
(2018); see also Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1573–74
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
103. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (notice recording statute).
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (2018).
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(4) (2018).
106. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). Like-
wise, courts generally hold that a deed to land obtained via fraud creates voida-
ble title which can become good title if it is transferred to a subsequent bona
fide purchaser who lacks knowledge of the fraud. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
PROPERTY CONCISE EDITION 390 (2d ed. 2017).
107. See U.C.C. § 2-403(3).
108. Newell v. Hadley, 92 N.E. 507, 512 (Mass. 1910).
109. Id.
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VII. USE RIGHTS IN PATENTED ARTICLES
Adoption by Impression Products of a patent exhaustion rule based on
maintaining alienability of patented articles weighs heavily in favor of adopt-
ing a bona fide purchaser rule for patented articles. Otherwise, the ability to
license patent rights that are less than ownership rights may be negatively
impacted.
If the patentee initially only provides use rights in a patented article, in
lieu of selling it, patent exhaustion should not apply to that article. In this
situation, the article at issue has not been sold, and title to the article remains
with the patentee. Therefore, the bright-line rule established in the Impres-
sion Products decision for the application of patent exhaustion upon the sale
of the article has not been crossed. Nevertheless, the potential exists for the
possessor of the article to resell it to a third party who may be unaware that
the seller lacks title to the article. In such a situation, the third party should
only obtain whatever interest in the article the seller possesses. However, if
the third party buyer purchases the item in good faith, without any notice that
the seller lacks good title to the article, the buyer should be treated as a bona
fide purchaser, which would permit him or her to obtain good title to the
article based on equity.110 This approach is commonly used with regard to the
sale of tangible personal property and real estate.111 The same approach
should be used for the sale of patented articles or products.112
VIII. MARKET EFFECTS
Whether patented products could be provided to users without transfer-
ring ownership in the products will be determined by practical considera-
tions, consumer demand, and technological change. In theory, however, a
patentee could offer products to purchasers in three different transactions.113
The patented article could be sold with no restrictions, triggering patent ex-
haustion for the specific articles sold so that patent rights in those articles
would end.114 Alternatively, the article could be sold subject to a contractual
agreement between the patentee and the buyer.115 Any breach of that contract
would be remediable by a breach of contract action brought by the patentee
against the buyer.116 Finally, the patentee could utilize a property approach
110. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 106, at 390.
111. Id.
112. See generally NIMMER, supra note 72, § 11:73, at 11-162 (2010) (noting a sim-
ilar approach has generally not been used for licensing of intellectual property).
113. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1533–34
(2017).
114. Id. at 1533.
115. Id. at 1526.
116. Id.
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and only provide a third party a use right in the patented article.117 Typically,
the parties would have to enter an agreement comprised of two parts: a grant
of property rights in the form of use rights and any contractual agreement
related to the use rights agreed to by the parties.118 This property approach
would not trigger patent exhaustion because the article was not provided via
a sale.119 A patent infringement action for use of the article in violation of
patent rights could be brought against using the article contrary to the paten-
tee’s rights.120 Additionally, the patentee could bring an action against the
original contracting party if any rights in the contractual agreement were vio-
lated.121 However, any party subject to a patent infringement suit for use of
the patented article would be able to assert a bona fide purchaser defense if
they were not on notice of patent rights in the specific article.122 This defense
would enable the article to freely flow in commerce, which would satisfy the
policy of preventing restraints on alienation from interfering with
commerce.123
Under the facts asserted in Impression Products, it may be difficult for
Lexmark to provide laser printer ink cartridges directly to consumers from a
brick and mortar store via any transaction other than a sale. However, online
sales of the same cartridges could use a click-through agreement on the web-
site that conveys less than ownership rights in the cartridge, thereby avoiding
patent exhaustion in the cartridges sold online.124 Nevertheless, suing individ-
ual online purchasers for patent infringement for reselling the spent car-
tridges to remanufacturers would likely be an undesirable approach. In
contrast, college textbooks are now available for either sale or rental by the
semester.125 Additionally, technology can make providing only use rights in
books a plausible alternative.126 For example, books provided online only in
117. Id. at 1534.
118. Id. at 1538.
119. See generally Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1538.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Loebach, 145 F.3d 1454, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
123. Robert Taylor, A Short History Lesson on Patent Policy, IP WATCHDOG (June
21, 2015), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/06/21/a-short-history-lesson-on-
patent-policy/id=58833/.
124. See Are “Click Through” Agreements Enforceable?, WILMER HALE (Mar. 22,
2000), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandNewsDetail.aspx?
NewsPubId=86850; see also MICHAEL RUSTAD & CYRUS DAFTARY, E-BUSI-
NESS LEGAL HANDBOOK 571 (2002 ed.) (click through licenses also called
clickwrap or webwrap agreements).
125. See, e.g., Rent Textbooks, VALORE BOOKS, https://www.valorebooks.com/rent-
textbooks (last visited May 1, 2018).
126. See generally id.
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electronic form, such as Kindle books from Amazon, are subject to ongoing
control by the seller which facilitates providing mere use rights in lieu of
outright ownership of an individual copy of the book.127
IX. ANALOGIZE TO COPYRIGHT LAW
Impression Products relies on copyright decisions by analogy to resolve
when patent exhaustion applies.128 In fact, Impression Products emphasizes
the historic connection between patent and copyright law with regard to ex-
haustion.129 Hence, it is reasonable to examine how copyright law applies
exhaustion concepts. Like patent exhaustion, copyright exhaustion,130 often
referred to as the first-sale doctrine,131 is based on a policy favoring the
avoidance of restraints on alienation of articles that incorporate intellectual
property.132 This frees courts from the difficulty of applying restrictions to
specific goods which are both easily movable and difficult to trace.133 Copy-
right exhaustion has a common law ancestry,134 just like patent exhaustion.135
However, unlike patent exhaustion, copyright exhaustion has been codified
in the federal Copyright Act.136 The distribution right,137 the public display
right,138 and the public performance right139 are granted by copyright law to
the copyright owner. However, the Copyright Act specifies that exhaustion
applies to “the owner of a particular copy” of certain copyrighted works and
terminates these rights.140 The Copyright Act reinforces the notion that the
sale of a copy of a copyrighted work is required for exhaustion to apply by
stating that exhaustion does not apply “to any person who has acquired pos-
session of the copy . . . from the copyright owner . . . by rental, lease, loan, or
127. See Kindle Store Terms of Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeId=200771440 (last updated Mar. 15, 2016).
128. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 525 (2013)
(holding that copyright exhaustion, referred to as the first-sale doctrine, extends
to foreign produced goods subsequently imported into the United States).
129. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1536 (2017).
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2018).
131. See NARD ET AL., supra note 47, at 657–58.
132. See Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 538–42.
133. See id. at 539.
134. See id.; see also Quality King Distribs. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135,
142 (1998) (Congress codified first-sale doctrine in Copyright Act).
135. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1536 (2017).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2018).
137. Id. § 106(3).
138. Id. § 106(5).
139. Id. § 106(4).
140. Id. § 109(a), (c), (e).
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otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it.”141 Additionally, the statutory
scheme lays out specific rules for certain copyrightable subject matter in the
form of computer software and electronic audiovisual games.142 This estab-
lishes a comprehensive statutory scheme for copyright exhaustion that is a
balance of several underlying considerations, including the effect on certain
specific industries. In contrast, Congress did not balance multiple underlying
considerations to create a statutory scheme governing patent exhaustion.143
Hence, the common law policy identified by the Supreme Court of disfavor-
ing restraints on the alienation of goods is the controlling or dominant policy
undergirding common law patent exhaustion.144
Nevertheless, the distinction between a sale of a copyrighted work and
acquiring rights in such work that are less than ownership should apply
equally to both patented and copyrighted works. Under both bodies of law,
exhaustion is triggered by a sale of the protected work.145 However, just as
transferring less than ownership of a copyrighted work does not activate cop-
yright exhaustion, such a transfer of a patented article should not activate
patent exhaustion.
X. WHEN LICENSES ARE SALES
One issue that can arise is whether a license transaction is actually a de
facto sale triggering exhaustion as opposed to an actual license that would
not trigger exhaustion. This issue has arisen in the copyright context and has
been addressed by courts. In Adobe Systems v. Christenson, the Ninth Circuit
noted “that some purported software licensing agreements may actually cre-
ate a sale.”146 The court then relied on the earlier decision in Vernor v.
Autodesk, Inc. to state a test for ascertaining whether a license is a legitimate
license or a de facto sale.147 The court stated:
To determine whether there is a legitimate license, we examine
whether the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a
license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the
software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions. Where these
factors aren’t satisfied, the upshot is that the copyright holder has
sold its software to the user, and the user can assert the first sale
defense.148
141. 17 U.S.C. § 109(d).
142. Id. §§ 109(b)(1)(B)–(e).
143. See generally id.
144. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1526 (2017).
145. Id. at 1538.
146. Adobe Sys. v. Christenson, 809 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015).
147. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010).
148. Adobe Sys., 809 F.3d at 1078.
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In Vernor, the court found a license existed for software.149 The court
focused on a number of factors including retention of title by the licensor and
significant restrictions placed on the licensee.150 First, the licensee could not
transfer or lease the software without the licensor’s consent.151 Second, the
software could not be transferred outside the Western Hemisphere.152 Third,
the software could not be modified or reverse engineered, nor could any copy
protection be removed.153 Finally, the license provided for its termination
upon violation of any license restrictions.154 An analogous examination of
patent licenses can be conducted to ascertain whether the license is a legiti-
mate license or a de facto sale.155
XI. CONCLUSION
In Impression Products, the Supreme Court provided a bright line rule
for triggering patent exhaustion and a clear justification for the doctrine.156
The sale of a patented product, whether foreign or domestic, automatically
causes the application of exhaustion to the product sold.157 This prevents re-
straints on alienation that could arise if such sale was conditional in nature or
subject to restrictions that the initial or a subsequent buyer might not be
aware of.158 Nevertheless, downstream control of patented products may be
desirable for brand protection and to maximize return on investment.159 If
such control is driven by anticompetitive motivations or practices, antitrust
and/or patent misuse law can provide applicable remedies.160 Conditional
sales contracts, in light of Impression Products, are to be evaluated under
contract law and policed by breach of contract actions.161
Impression Products does not foreclose reliance on a property-based ap-
proach for transferring patented products without activating the patent ex-
haustion doctrine. Under this approach, a patent owner would only grant
149. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1102.
150. Id. at 1109.




155. See generally Vernor, 621 F.3d. at 1102.
156. See generally Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523,
1536 (2017).
157. Id. at 1537.
158. Id. at 1538.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1533.
161. Id. at 1526.
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third parties use rights in a particular patented product in lieu of transferring
ownership, and the patent owner would continue to own the particular prod-
uct.162 Such use rights, granted pursuant to a license, are analogous to a simi-
lar approach utilized for both real and personal property.163 Nevertheless, the
granting of mere use rights could inadvertently act as a restraint on alienation
if a downstream possessor of the patented good is unaware that he or she has
only acquired use rights rather than ownership of the good. This problem,
which is not limited to patented goods, has traditionally been dealt with via
bona fide purchaser rules.164 Typically, a party who acquires goods without
knowledge of restrictions on the goods takes free of such restrictions if he or
she lacks notice of the restrictions.165 A similar approach to patented goods
would mean licensing use rights would not trigger patent exhaustion.166 How-
ever, patent exhaustion would be applicable if a third party acquired posses-
sion of the goods without knowledge that only use rights in the goods were
provided rather than a transfer of ownership. This approach is consistent with
exhaustion under copyright law, which, analogous to Impression Products,
applies copyright exhaustion to the sale of a copyrighted product but not to
the license of rights that are not ownership.167
In light of this approach, a provider of patented goods can provide the
goods via at least three different transactions.168 First, an outright sale could
be used, which would trigger the patent exhaustion doctrine.169 Second, the
goods could be provided subject to contractual rights and limitations that
would trigger exhaustion.170 Any violation of the rights or limitations would
be enforceable via a breach of contract action.171 Finally, third parties could
obtain a license to use the patented goods.172 This would not trigger patent
exhaustion and, therefore, an action for patent infringement would still be
available.173 However, if the third party, or a successor in interest, lacked
notice that only use rights were originally transferred, then bona fide pur-
162. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1533–34.
163. Id.
164. Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Johnson, 109 F. Supp. 157, 168 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
165. Id.
166. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1527.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1532.
169. Id. at 1526.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1534.
173. Id.
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chaser rules would apply and patent exhaustion would bar a patent infringe-
ment action.174 The transaction type a patent owner chose to use would be
driven by business and market factors.
174. Id.
